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Existing environmental policies have deviated from measures suggested by economic 
and environmental analysis. This is especially true in the case in drought response and 
water reform policies where efficient solutions were rarely adopted.  This suggests 
that for policy to be accepted it has to address both political and social barriers, 
particularly political feasibility. It is argued that the aspirations and the power of 
interest groups give rise to water policy multidimensional packages.  These policy 
packages are more likely to be political feasible and politically robust than policies 
with single objectives, and thus will be adopted by decision makers as a policy. The 
evolutions of the management strategies of the California drought of 1986-1992, and 
the negotiations over the Central Valley Project Improvement Act, are used as 
examples of timing and creation of politically feasible policy packages (including 
water trading and environmental water allocations) compromising conflicting 
interests.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
